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MD/JAG/FS/JC/15(3A)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ILLTREATMENT OF BRITISH
PRISONERS OF WAR IN JAVA AND SUMATRA BETWEEN
1942 and 1945

A F F I D A V I T

I, Wing Commander PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS, No. 39862, Royal Air Force (Pilot) at present on the strength of No. 106 P.R.C., R.A.F. Station, Cosford, and on 42 days repatriation leave at my permanent home address "Lyndhurst", 20 Cliff Parade, Leigh-on-Sea, Essex, make oath and say as follows:-

The Report which is now produced and shown to me marked "PSD1" is a report compiled by me on the 19th November 1945 relating to Japanese War Crimes in Java and Sumatra between 8th March 1942 and 20th September 1945.

The facts set out in the Report are true and are within my own knowledge except where the contrary is stated.

SWORN by the said PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS)
at 6 Spring Gardens in the City of)
WESTMINSTER this nineteenth day of)
November 1945) (Signed) PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS.

BEFORE ME:

G. BARRATT, Lieutenant-colonel,
Legal Staff.

Military Department,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

I certify that this is a true copy of the original affidavit.

/s/ G. Barratt, Lt. Col.,
Legal Staff,
Office of the Judge Advocate
General.

"P.S.D.1."

This is the Report marked "P.S.D.1" referred to in the Affidavit of Wing Commander Patrick Slaney Davis sworn this nineteenth day of November 1945
BEFORE ME

G. BARRATT, Lieutenant-colonel, Legal Staff.
Military Dept., Office of the Judge Advocate General,
London, S.W.1.

REPORT BY WING COMMANDER P.S. DAVIS, ROYAL AIR FORCE, RELATING TO THREE
AND HALF YEARS PRISONER OF WAR CAPTIVITY UNDER THE JAPANESE IN J.V. AND
SUMATRA. - MARCH 8th, 1942 to SEPTEMBER 20th, 1945.

I, Wing Commander Patrick Slaney DAVIS, No. 39862, Royal Air Force (Pilot) at present on the strength of No. 106 F.A.C., R.A.F. Station, Cosford, and on 42 days repatriation leave at my permanent home address - "Lyndhurst", 20 Cliff Parade, Leigh-on-Sea, Essex, report as follows:-

2. In January 1942, I was serving as the No. 2 Organisation Staff Officer to Air Headquarters Far East, Sime Road, Singapore, on the 2nd February, 1942, I was posted to the near Headquarters Royal Air Force, Palembang, Sumatra. After two weeks, Palembang was attacked by Japanese Forces and I proceeded to Royal Air Force Headquarters, Java, located at Soekarno Bumi, under the Command of Air Vice Marshal MALTBY. On 26th February, 1942, a new Allied Headquarters was opened at the Military Academy situated on the Dagoeg, Bandoeng, under the command of Air Chief Marshal, Sir Richard FIERCE. After four days, I returned to Soekarno Bumi and on the 3rd March, 1942 I returned to Bandoeng, when Air Vice Marshal MALTBY took over as Allied Commander in Chief From General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Fierce. On 8th March, 1942, the Japanese attack on Java had progressed to the extent that the aerodrome at Kalijati had fallen to their occupation and a serious aerial attack was in progress against MDIR, the aerodrome south of the city of Bandoeng. Considerable confusion existed and it was decided to withdraw the present Headquarters to the Central Hotel, Tasik Malaya, where I proceeded on the 7th March, 1942, accompanied by Group Captain COGGLE. On the afternoon of March 8th, 1942, we were officially informed by the Dutch that a decision to capitulate to the Japanese Forces had been reached. Air Vice Marshal MALTBY decided to withdraw the British Forces located around Tasik Malaya and the Australian Forces located around Buitenzorg to the hills above Garoet and their dispose his forces to withstand the enemy. I was ordered by Air Commodore STATION to take command of the convoy of British troops from Tasik Malaya to Pamegatan, a tea estate situated in the hills above Garoet. On the afternoon of the 9th March, 1942, I reported to Air Commodore STATION the successful arrival of the whole convoy. The British force was disposed on the hills around Pamegatan, the Australian Force being dispersed on the next range of hills lying to the right of the British position. On approximately 10th March, 1942, we were informed by Air Vice Marshal MALTBY that the British Force had to surrender, together with the Dutch, under the terms of the capitulation by General ter FOORTEN, Royal Dutch Netherland East Indies Army.

3. On the 11th March, 1942, I proceeded to BANDOENG with Air Vice Marshal MALTBY and after spending the night in the Dutch Headquarters at BANDOENG, visited the Japanese Staff who had established themselves in the PHILIPPA HOTEL, BANDOENG. Air Vice Marshal MALTBY and I proceeded back to GIHOET with the Japanese terms. On approximately 16th March, 1942, I was ordered by Air Vice Marshal MALTBY to form an Advance Headquarters at a Railway Station at TJIBATU near GIHOET, where we were to work as Railway Control Officers to pass the entire British Force in groups of 600 through to the BATAVIA area. On approximately 18th March, 1942, Air Vice Marshal MALTBY was injured in a car accident and was taken to the Allied Hospital, Bandoeng, and that evening Air Commodore STATION and Group Captain BISHOP were ordered to the Japanese Headquarters, Bandoeng, from which trip they did not return. The Japanese under a Major SHITO were demanding much information which under the terms of my orders from Air Vice Marshal MALTBY, I could not give and I sent a dispatch rider to Air Commodore SILLY, who was located at Tasik Malaja, with a force of approximately 2000 unarmed airmen. Air Commodore SILLY arrived that evening and took command. Two days later, I left with Air Commodore SILLY and proceeded to Tasik Malaja where we located in a house pending the arrangement that the Japanese said they would make under the terms of which Air Commodore SILLY and his Staff (of which I was a member) would co-operate with the Japanese Headquarters and the International Red Cross representatives for the general co-ordination of the Japanese plans in respect of the prisoners of war taken in Java.

3A. Two days later, I was taken ill with Malign Tertiary Malaria and sent by the Principal Medical Officer, Wing Commander C. COFFEY, R.A.F., to the Allied Hospital Bandoeng, at that time commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DUNIOP, Australian Medical Service. Two days later I was transferred by the Japanese to a hospital at TJIMAH, where I remained as a patient for two months.

4. I then returned to Tasik Malaja on or about the 15th May, 1942, remaining there for two weeks, accommodated in a hangar on the aerodrome and then proceeded with all other personnel by train to SOERABAYA, where 1500 officers and men of the British force were accommodated in extremely cramped conditions in the Soerabaya Grammar School. The Camp Commander, working under the Japanese, was Wing Commander VINES, Royal Air Force. Seven months later, the command having changed in the meantime to Wing Commander NELCH, R.A.F., I proceeded to the Darmo Camp, also in Soerabaya, where conditions were extremely good. I remained there for six weeks and was then transferred to Yarmart Camp, in central Soerabaya, under the command of Captain BLOOM, Royal Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army. I remained there until the middle of April, 1943, when I was transferred to the Tjimahi Camp, near Bandoeng, commanded by Commander HOOT, R.D.N.E.I.A. I remained there for six weeks and was transferred to the Bandoeng Camp under the Commander of Wing Commander NICHOLIS, R.A.F. On 28th December 1943, I was transferred with the whole of the personnel of the Bandoeng Camp to the Cycle Camp, Batavia, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel JANCING, R.D.N.E.I. Army where I remained until my departure in May, 1944, as commander of the draft of 2000 men posted to an unknown destination.

5. The Japanese Officers who within my certain knowledge were personally responsible for bad living conditions and ill treatment were:- Colonel KAWABE, who had been commander of all P.O.Ws in the Soerabaya area and who had consistently refused the appeals of Allied Officers for medicine and food (See report of Wing Commander, C.COFFEY, R.A.F. Principal Medical Officer Soerabaya Camps), and Lieutenant SONI, who was commander of the Cycle Camp, and who in my presence wilfully maltreated prisoners of war and who has a record of unparalleled cruelty in the Batavia area. (See report of Wing Commander NICHOLLS, R.A.F. and Lieutenant Colonel VANDERFEST, Intelligence Corps, British Army). I cannot give further detailed reports on Japanese in Java as I was never in a position to obtain exact details, but the Allied Officers referred to above, especially Lt. Col. VANDERFEST, have been in a position to obtain detailed facts of the whole area. A valuable report has been submitted to the Allied Headquarters, South East Asia, by Lt. Col. L. LEWY, R.A.M.C. who was the doctor commanding the Allied Hospital Batavia for approximately three years.

6. Colonel KAWABE is a small, wizened Japanese Officer, approximately five feet tall and of typical Japanese appearance. Lieutenant SONI, on the other hand, is young, approximately 30 years old, and extremely smart in his appearance, but walks with a pronounced swagger. He is rather handsome and is about five feet nine inches, of athletic appearance and is decidedly non-Japanese in facial characteristics. I cannot remember the names of the Commanders of the individual Soerabaya Camps but KAWABE was Supreme Commander of the area for General S.ITO whose Headquarters were in Singapore. The Tjamahi Camp was commanded by 1st Lieutenant Y.M.GUCHI, another brutal officer on whom Major HOOT will report. The Bandoeng Camp by Captain TCHAKAGI, an officer who did not control his guards but who was not responsible for any atrocities as far as I know. (See report Wing Commander NICHOLLS and Lieutenant Colonel VANDERFEST). The Cycle Camp was commanded by Lieutenant SONI (See para 5 above).

SULLIVAN DRAFT.

7. [On 1st March 1944, a draft was selected by the Japanese from personnel of the Cycle Camp, Batavia, consisting of 2 battalions of 1000 men each, comprising in total approximately 1750 Dutch and 250 English.] No. 1 Battalion was commanded by Wing Commander NIGHTWICK R.A.F., and No. 2 Battalion by Lieut. Col. IBBEKOORN, R.D.M.C. The personnel of this draft was segregated from the rest of the Camp and placed on extra rations. Numerous dysentery tests were made (approximately one per week) and a very casual effort was made to re-kit personnel, but as nearly all the clothing issued was Dutch pattern uniforms intended for small native troops, very little could be utilised by the personnel on the draft. Towards the end of April, 1944, Wing Commander NIGHTWICK was admitted to the Camp Hospital suffering from dysentery, and I volunteered to take his place. I applied to Captain TCHAKAGI, the Japanese Commander of the draft, and when I explained that a large percentage of the British troops proceeding on the draft had previously been under my command, he accepted me as draft Commander.

8. [On the morning of the 14th May, 1944, the party marched with full kit from the Cycle Camp to Pasir Sinan Station, Batavia and entrained for Tandjong Frick docks. There we embarked on a Japanese transport of approximately 5000 tons; 1000 men including all the British being accommodated in the forward hold and the remaining 1000 Dutch personnel in the aft hold. By application to Captain TCHAKAGI, I was allowed to bring the personnel of the forward hold on to the deck for Physical training in batches of 50 for 15 minutes at a time and I obtained permission to use one of the ships pumps for the men to bathe. Food and tea were available. The accommodation in the hold was extremely cramped, the men sitting upright with their legs round the men in front of them. Numerous cases of prostration had to be brought on deck, especially during the midday hours. The guards were not troublesome during the journey. The ship was in convoy with two other ships of approximately 5000 tons each, escorted by a Japanese corvette, with one Japanese bomber as aerial cover. Our sister ships were carrying approximately 5000 Javanese coolies under disgusting conditions. No incidents occurred during the voyage.

9. On the evening of the 17th May, 1944, we docked at PADANG, Sumatra, and disembarked and marched approximately 12 kilometres to a disused cinema. No food was provided and no lavatory accommodation being available in the cinema. The following morning we marched a further 8 kilometers to the Padang Civil Gaol, where we were accommodated where normally 500 native prisoners were confined, we had 2000 of our draft and approximately 1500 of the Indonesian coolies that had arrived in our convoy. All these coolies were suffering from disease, mostly dysentery (both bacillary and amoebic) and a form of conjunctivitis. They were dying in large numbers. No lavatory accommodation was available and the drains of the gaol were full of blood from the defecation of the Indonesians. I called for volunteers to dig latrines and we attempted to clear the portion of the Camp that had been allotted to ourselves. A meal of approximately 200 grams of rice only was given to us at about 1800 hours, and at 2000 hours I was instructed to leave with my battalion (1000 men) for an unknown destination. We marched out, carrying with us approximately 200 grams of rice per man and marched about 6 kilometres to the railhead where we entrained in terribly crowded conditions and proceeded 124 kilometres to Poya Komboe. There we were met by Japanese motor transport and driven a further 180 kilometres to Pakur Baroe, where we were accommodated in a Camp which had contained Indonesians and which was indescribably filthy. I appealed to the Japanese Commander for food and was told that none was available. The following day the whole party were set to work to clean up the Camp and at approximately 1600 hours a meal of rice porridge only (kind of porridge) was issued. The following day at 8 a.m. 900 men left the Camp and commenced work on the railway. They had to work extremely hard carrying sleepers, rails, and working with four pound hammers throughout the entire day, without food or shelter.

10. Although we were completely inexperienced in this type of work, our overseers were a group of Japanese soldiers straight from the Burma railway prisoner of war gangs and the same slave driving conditions and brutality was adopted. The men returned to Camp at approximately 9 p.m. and after the

privations of the journey from Batavia, they were utterly exhausted but the Japanese explained that they could not give us any further food until our rations arrived. For the next five days, the situation remained unchanged. I personally experienced considerable trouble with the Japanese Adjutant (1st Lieut. T.N.K.) because of the rise in sickness. I explained that unless we received food, no improvement could be expected and the water that we were compelled to drink was extremely bad because it came from sulphur springs. At the end of the five days mentioned above, a Japanese Colonel whose name I never knew but who was completely responsible for the railway construction in Pakan Baroe at that time, visited the Camp. He was an old man with gray hair and had a pronounced stoop and he told me that I must do my utmost to promote the welfare of the men under my command. I explained the ration and water situation to him and told him that the working hours were much too long. The Interpreter stated that the Colonel could do nothing about these working hours but that he would look into the food situation. [That evening I heard that Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN, with the remaining 1000 men had arrived at a Camp approximately three kilometres away. The following day our food supplies arrived and the day after, I moved with my men on a transfer of all the personnel from my Camp to Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN's camp and Col. SLABBEKOORN, with his men, to my Camp.

11. The heavy working parties continued despite a dysentery outbreak which the Allied doctors attributed to the conditions in the Padang gaol.) On the 24th July, 1944, approximately 20 kilometres of rail had been completed and I was instructed to post the first five railway gangs, each comprising 50 men, to the Camp known as Camp three approximately 15 kilometres distant from my Camp in the direction of Padang. The draft left under the Command of Lieutenant DALLAS, 3rd Hussars, and was joined a few days later by an additional 150 British under the command of Captain ARMSTRONG, R.A.S.C., who took over command of the Camp on arrival.

12. By this time I had arranged for limited canteen facilities for the local purchase of extra food when available and I was responsible for Camp 3 as well as my own. Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN's Camp being No. 1 Camp, mine No. 2 Camp and Captain ARMSTRONG's No. 3 Camp, all administered from my Camp. It was extremely difficult to administer these Camps as I was not allowed freedom of action by the Japanese and two thirds of the personnel under my command being Dutch with a very limited knowledge of the English language. The medium of expression with the Japanese was the Malay language and with the Dutch Malay, French or English in that order. I therefore formed a Camp Committee of the responsible Dutchmen to assist myself and my Adjutant Lieut. der HARTOG, in administering the whole group.

13. At about this time, Captain TCHAKAGI, sent for me and explained that he was returning to Java, with our Korean guards, and that we would be handed over to the control of Japanese civilians and Japanese guards and would come directly under the South Manchurian Railway Company. Two days afterwards he handed over to Captain MIYASAKI, who arrived from Medan accompanied by Lieutenant DOI. MIYASAKI assumed command of all prisoner of war camps in the Pakan Baroe area and DOI was in command of No. 2 Camp. Towards the end of

July, 1944, a further draft of prisoners of war comprising approximately 150 Officers and 100 men arrived in No. 2 Camp from Singapore - these men being the survivors of the draft that left Medan, Sumatra, for Singapore and were torpedoed en route (See report Captain J. G. GORDON, R.A. an eye-witness to the incident.) In addition we were informed that further drafts had arrived ex. Singapore and had opened up two further Camps (Nos. 4 and 5) and these were also placed under my administration. At about this time, [I was informed that No. 2 Camp was to officially the sick Camp, all fit men to be sent working on the railway from the up-country camps and all sick being returned to me until fit enough to act as replacements or to work from my Camp, Wing Commander COFFEY, Senior Medical Officer, and I made repeated appeals to the Japanese (Captain MIYASAKI) for improved conditions, less work, more food and medicines, but all our appeals were of no avail as we were informed that food was not available and Doctor ISHII, the Japanese doctor in charge of P.C.W. Camps, told Wing Commander COFFEY that as medicine was not available we must grow our own herbs and make our own. The less heavy sick were forced to do garden work as Lieutenant DOI said that the ration situation would deteriorate due to lack of transport to convey the rations from BANGKUNG, the nearest town approximately 65 kilometres distant. The Allied doctors experienced extreme difficulty in dealing with the heavy number of sick, at this period about 800; mostly dysentery, malaria, beri-beri, avitaminotic diseases, pellagra and some tuberculosis, and in addition, a large number of tropical ulcer cases. Practically no medicine or dressings were available.] (See reports of Lt. Col. HANNESSY, A.A.M.C. and Wing Commander COFFEY, R.A.F.)

14. [On about 17th September, 1944, I was ordered to anticipate the arrival of a further number of seriously sick cases and I heard from a Korean guard that a further draft had been torpedoed between Java and Padang with very heavy casualties. On approximately the 19th September, 1944, two ambulances arrived with some 20 cases, most of whom died within a day or two, I was told that the remainder were in the gaol at Padang and in the Padang hospital. However, the remaining personnel were posted to Camps 4 and 5 and approximately one week later, 150 sick and dying men arrived in the middle of the night in my camp. At this period, although we had received no clothing for nearly three years, I was ordered by the Japanese to produce as much clothing as possible for the draft mentioned above as the Japanese explained that as the British had sunk this convoy and as the Japanese could not produce clothing, we must provide it ourselves. This was done to the best of our ability but the conditions at Camp 4 were extremely bad.] The Commander of Camp 4 was Captain KNOON, R.D.N.E.I. Army and Captain ROSIAT, R.D.N.E.I. Army was in charge of Camp 5.

15. [At the end of November, 1944, I was informed that a Camp 6 had been established with the personnel who had left Medan some eight months previously for road construction work in Atjeh, North Sumatra, where they had been commanded by a Japanese Officer, Lieut. MIR, an English speaking Japanese, and an extremely bad type.] (See reports Captain GORDON, R.A. and Lieut. HEDLEY, Johore Engineers) [These men arrived in a very debilitated condition but nevertheless, were put on to railway construction work immediately.

Lieutenant MURA visited my Camp and asked me for a senior British Officer to command the British personnel in his Camp, the Dutch being under the command of Captain van der LANDE, an extremely efficient Dutch Officer now commanding Sumatra under British Administration. I posted Captain GORDON to command the British in No. 6 Camp and he left that day accompanied by Lieut. MURA.

16. At this period, the general situation regarding prisoners of war was deteriorating rapidly and I again made repeated appeals to Lieutenant DOI for an improvement in the situation. The appeals were all refused. We produced statistical reports showing the increasing death rate rising to approximately 80 per month was entirely due to lack of food and heavy work, but Lieut. DOI merely informed me that he considered that all the Officers should be made to do more work and that I and my staff were merely trying to sabotage the Japanese war efforts. These conditions deteriorated further and the death rate rose due to the constant exchange of personnel from the up country camps who had fallen sick who were replaced by only semi-fit men from No. 2 Camp.

17. On approximately 16th June, 1945, I was informed that the railway must be finished by the 15th August, 1945, and that every available man who could walk must be sent out to work. Despite our protests, medical parades were held by the Japanese and the men were forced out to work. The health situation of the whole area was now deteriorating with great rapidity, no medicine was available and the whole group was utterly exhausted and all personnel were extremely depressed due to constant slave driving by the Japanese guards and railway officials. Increased supervision by the Kempeitai (Japanese Secret Police) was felt and all sorts of additional disciplinary pressure was brought to bear on us.]

18. At this point, the Japanese guards in Camp 2 were replaced by Korean guards and the illicit buying of foodstuffs increased and life inside the Camp became more bearable as the Koreans' attitude, although not pro-Allied, was definitely anti-Japanese. This state of affairs continued until our release.

19. I submitted a detailed report of war criminals to Major GLOUGH, attached to the Intelligence Branch, Force 136, SEAC Headquarters, Goodwood Park Hotel, Singapore, and appended below are the names and description of the major criminals responsible for our condition in Sumatra during the 18 months that I commanded there.

↑
CAPTAIN MIYASAKI. In charge of all Prisoner of War Camps in the Pakan Baroe Area. A fat officer of medium height with a pronounced squint. He showed no interest whatsoever in the welfare of the Camps and although fully aware of the situation, gave us no assistance and was in fact always insolent whenever approached.

1st LIEUTENANT DOI. Camp Commander No. 2 Camp and Captain MIYASAKI's Adjutant. Another fat officer of medium height. Aged approximately 38 and according to my information, a watchmaker before the war. He was solely responsible for the extreme pressure put upon the men. He visited the Camp on numerous occasions and when groups of sick men were pointed out to him, he merely laughed and said we were but prisoners of war. A bestial type who had no control whatsoever over his guards.

1st LIEUTENANT (DOCTOR) ISHII. Medical Officer all prisoner of war Camps Pakan Baroe Area. A short Japanese Officer wearing glasses. A medical student before the war. Although fully aware of the critical situation expressed himself incapable of improving the conditions, and although he stated that no medicines or dressing were available, he had a large stock for Japanese consumption and after the capitulation produced a very large quantity of the drugs we had so urgently requested.

SERGEANT KATO. Camp Sergeant No. 2 Camp in January/February, 1944. He was a bestial slave driver who took extreme delight in forcing sick men out to work. He placed all possible restrictions on the Camps and severely punished any infringement of the most trivial order. He was responsible for stopping all meat issues to the Camp for a period of over five weeks. He was a heavily built country type of Japanese and was extremely powerful. (Last unit MINOTAI).

SERGEANT KITAGAWA. Camp Sergeant No. 2 Camp from March, 1944 to July, 1944. Was if possible worse than his predecessor. Was unapproachable and had a particular hatred for the sick and for Officers. He took great delight in forcing sick men out to work and his favorite form of punishment was to make a man hold an extremely heavy piece of wood above his head for a long period. He agitated his guards to punish prisoners severely for any infringements of the rules.] At times, he completely stopped all canteen purchases but at other times purchased large quantities of eggs and beef for the camp - his only redeeming feature. Another extremely powerful country type of Japanese, very heavily built and of medium height. (Last unit MIYASAKITAI).

1st Class Soldier KATO. (Last unit MINOTAI). A schoolmaster before the war. Slim, of medium height, wearing glasses and an extremely narrow face. Made a practice of beating prisoners of war and making them stand to attention in front of him for long periods each time he was on guard. Named: Four-eyes, Blue-Shirt.

KOREAN GUARD M.TSIAMA. (Miyasakitai) was in charge of transport in No. 2 Camp Headquarters. Was an extremely reckless driver who frequently injured POWs through his carelessness. On one occasion, threw four prisoners of war from his truck due to bad driving and immediately afterwards made all the occupants of the truck parade for check. As one of them could not stand properly to attention as he had been injured in the accident, M.TSIAMA struck him across the face with his torch causing a fracture of the jaw. The P.O.W. in question was L.A.C. DR. FER, R....F. M.TSIAMA was a tall, slim Korean with a long record of brutality towards prisoners of war.

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↑ **2nd Class SOLDIER FUJI.** (Last Unit: MINOTAI). A very short, stocky, wide faced Japanese. By far the worst guard in my experience as a prisoner of war. He took an extreme delight in bestial actions and has a record of beating someone on every occasion that he came inside the Camp. As in the case of Dutch soldier MOLEMA, who suffering with an extremely large ulcer on the left leg which had just commenced to heal, was approached by FUJI, who demanded to know why he did not stand up when a Japanese soldier approached. MOLEMA showed the ulcer on his leg and was immediately kicked upon it by FUJI. The result of this attack was the amputation some three days after and the death of MOLEMA some three weeks later due to weakness and shock. The witness to this attack is Lieutenant (Doctor) KINGMA, Dutch Netherlands Medical Service. Nicknamed: Tiger of Pakan, Baron Flowerpot, Napoleon.

↓ **1st CLASS SOLDIER YUNADA** (Last unit MINOTAI). One of the guard commanders of No. 2 Camp who assisted FUJI in most of his attacks. Like KITAGAWA delighted in making sick men hold large pieces of wood above their heads for long periods. A Japanese of above average height, heavily built and wore thick lens glasses. He was responsible for many totally unnecessary brutal attacks.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant.

(Sgd) F.S. DAVIS

Wing Commander, R.A.F.]

↑ [19.11.1945.

EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT # 5604

No. 1

書類第五〇四号

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口 供 書

余、英國空軍(バイロット)第三九〇二号、空軍中佐現任、
英國空軍部隊第一〇〇常設休養部所屬テ、エセラス州
リーリー、オニル、リバーフィールド、看地、本籍地リードハースト
甲十二日間、復員林駆逐ナリ、パトリック・スコット・スミス
上、以下、事ヲ述ル。1945年3月10日宣誓
今取次サシ、余見セラス。RE TURN TO 1945年3月10日報告書、一九四五年十月
十九日、余、旅テ作ラシ、一九四三年三月八日ヨリ一九四五年九月廿日三至
此間、ジヤフ及ビスカトニ、於ケル日本、戦争犯罪ニ關ス報告書テ
ア。報告書ニ述べラシ、事實、眞實、然ラサル旨、隙ベテアヒ國所
以外、余、真接、知識ニ係ル。

一九四五年本十月十九日、ウエストミンスター、ホースガリーナー、ガーデン、番
地ニテ前述、パトリック・スコット・スミスニ依リ宣誓サシタモノナリ。

(署名) パトリック・スコット・スミス

法律部員陸軍中佐、ジーバラット、面前ニテ
ロンドン市、S.W.1、陸軍省、法務長官事務所
余、本書、口供書原本、眞實、寫ニテコトヲ證明ス。

法務長官事務局法律部員

陸軍中佐、ジーバラット / 署名 /

Doc 5604

是の口ノドニ市⁷ S. S. 陸軍省法務長官事務局法律課
官中佐ハラツ山中佐、面前テ、一九四五年本土十月十九日宣誓セラ。
P. S. D. トハルシタ比報書⁷アハ。中二言及七

「山下入了」，日本軍人十二於九二年半，停辦至治二
自不某國宣軍、宣軍中佐山下入了、軍事委員會報告書
一九四二年六月八日至一九四三年九月廿日

七、一九四四年三月一日、日本軍二依リ、心付字ナセテ、沙勿
收容所、人質中カリ、被殺約千七百五十名、和蘭八百五
名、英國人トヲ包含入ル、各一千名)、二天隊、各成別傳
ガ標拔サシ。

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極度の疲労の爲め船を下りた。船は遠く遙かに見えたり。之の間、書道間隔多くあり。航海中、監視兵八名在り。其一船、各約五千噸、代二隻又船共二隻。日本、海防艦、護衛艦、日本駆逐艦、機雷艇、各一隻。遂に了局。然れど、全艦、載船、下約五千名、船内人苦力ヲ乗居り。航海中、何、子事件モ起らなかり。

九、一九四四年五月十七日、夕方、我々、スマトラ、パラガハ、二個船、下船、約十二糸歩にて使用せし居て映画館にて着衣及食物、銀、金、映画館にて、便所、設備、無かり。翌日朝、我々更に八糸歩にて、一般人監禁室にて、普通五百名、土人囚徒監禁せし所、收容せり。我々、我別動隊一千名と同護送船にて到着し、約一千五百名、印度ネギン人苦力ヲ有して居り。之等苦力、皆、病氣、主に赤痢、細菌性疾患、心性疾患、一種、結膜炎、霍乱にて居り、彼等、多數死んで行つた。便所、設備、得ラジ、監獄、下水溝、印度ネギン人、排泄物、臭い一杯アソブ。余、便所ヲ根治する意有り、我等、所、收容所、部分、清潔にてウシタ。

十時頃、約二百人、米食事が與合、ダラゲアソブ。ソテ二十時、余、余部隊一千名、率、了不明、目的地向て出發スルヤリ。命、ヤラヒ。我々、六人、約二百人、米食事持て出發。六糸歩程、末端停車場にて、其處、我々、七糸歩程、食事、汽車、乗せ、六十コムアソブ。テ百二十四糸進ム。其處、我々、日本、輸送自動車、迎ヘリ、更に三百六十糸、カタハ、テ運ベリ。其處、我々、前、印度ネギン人、一人にて、形容、難程、不潔、收容所、入ラヒ。余、日本、指揮官、食物、給與、無願シが、何モ無ト云ハリ。

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極度に疲勞して車椅子に甲板で運ばれながら、ナランカリ。之に随行する
間諜多かり。航海中、監視兵（ウルガリカ）其船各約五千噸、他二
隻、船上共二日本、海防艦三隻、輸送船二隻、日本軍艦、機雷艇一隻
等、居て居り。我之等、殊外、全艦、燃氣、下約五年船、火候人苦力ヲ乗
て居り。航海中、何、事件モ起ラスカリ。

九 一九四四年五月十七日、タガ・城タマストラ、ハーバーダイビング、ハーバー

下船後、約十二糸歩十丁傳明サシテ居て映画館に到着シ。食料
一鉢入り、映画館手前テ便所設備無カツ。翌朝、我公事二
糸歩テ、ダダダ一般人監獄到リ。普通五百名、土人囚徒監
禁サリ所収容サリ。我々我分別傷隊二千名十同シ護送船アリ
着着シテ一个五百名、一千下木千人苦力トコ有テ居リ。三等苦力
ハ、感冒病氣、主ニ赤痢（細菌性及ビアノ、性好）一種、結膜炎、
霍乱テ居タ。彼等多數死ニテ行ツ。便所、設備得ラビ、監
獄、下水溝、一千下木千人、排泄物、血、尿アシ。余、便所ヲ
掘、溝ニ有志其事務、我々皆サハリ収容所部分ヨリ清潔ニキ。
十八時頃、約二百瓦許リ、米食事が與エタダキアリ。シテ二十時、余
余部隊（千名）ヲ率テ不明、目的地向テ出發ス。命セラリ。
我々一人約一百瓦、米ヲ持テ出發シ。六糸程、末端停車場を歩
キ、其處我々ヒドク混々合シタ。汽車乘セヨ、ハココムアリテ
百二十四糸進ミタ。其處我々日本、輸送自動車。迎エリ、更
三百糸程、ハココアリテ置ケル。其處我々前二千下木千人
ヲ入テ、形容之難程不潔ナ収容所入ヒ。余ハ日本、指揮
官。食物、給縁ヲ懇願シテ、何ト云ヒ。

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明日、全部隊ハ收容所ヲ清掃セラシ、十六時頃、食事ヲ支給セリ。翌日午前八時、九百名ノ者が收容所ガラ出撃シ、鐵道、往復一始終。彼等ハ食物モ遮断、物モ無、枕木、線路ヲ運び、終日、四討度、金槌干仕事ヲスルナド、非常ニ激不勞働ヲセラシタ。然ハ此、林干仕事ニ全ク無経験アツタニモ拘ハズ、我々監督ハ、ビルマ、鐵道沿岸部隊カラ直接來タ一群、日本兵ア同様、奴隸ヲ使フ。如干苦酷十狀能心懲行ガ採用セタ。兵隊ハ午後九時頃收容所ニ歸ツテ來タガバ、カヤカラ、旅行、累難、後戻、彼等ハスツカリ被累テサマシタが、日本兵ハ我々、食糧が來ルマニ、之以上食事ヲ支給スル事ハ出来ナトト説明シタ。次、五回、其状態ハ其ノマ、續イタ。余自身モ疾病発生、為、日本人中尉(田中中尉)下少カラス卒ヒマシタ。余ハ、然カ食事ヲ支給セナレバ、何等、改善、期待スル所トハ出来ズ、又然々、飲マセテ居ル水ハ硫黃泉カラ來テ居ル為、非常ニ惡く事ヲ説明シタ。

其ノ夜、余ハスラベク、中佐が残リ、千名ヲ連ヒテ、約三野隔ツク所、收容所ニ到着シタ事ヲ聞イタ。翌日、我々、食糧が到着シ、其次、自余ハ、余收容所全員トスラベク、中佐、收容所全員、人ヒ要リ、為、余、即下ヲ連シテ移ツタ。

二、聯合軍医師が、ハンドンケ監獄状態、為アヒトシテ不衛、發生モ、闇ハス、空勞働部隊ハ續イタ。

三、才收容所ハ、公式ニ病人、收容所トナリ、傷兵者ハ皆無也、收容所カラ、飲食道三勤キヤラシ、病人ハ皆交代者トナリ、得程度三飯復スル、又ハ余、收容所カラ、勤キ行、心程度三丁ルマテ、余、下ニ送、帰サルト云々、事ヲ通告セタ。

N6. 4

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先後軍医將校ハコイ、官軍中佐ト余ハ、狀態改善、仕事、經濟、食糧ト医薬、増量ヲ保リ返シ、日本兵官崎大尉ニモ嘆願シタガ、我々、之等、嘆願ハ何、甲斐モナク、食糧ハ得テシナイト云ハレ、又復唐收容所担当、日本人医師、石井医師ハコイ、官軍中佐ニ、薬ヲ手入レコトハ出来ナリカラ、自分ニ薬草ヲ栽培、自分ニ薬作ラオケバナラナリト言ハレ、始末テアリタ。土居會計中尉カラ約六十五粒隔々、一町近ノ町、パンダシシカラ食糧ヲ運ブ、輸送機関、不足、爲食糧事情ハ悪化スルト云ハレタ。テ、重病チナリ者ハ、自仕テアセバナラナリタ。聯合軍医師ハ、非常ニ多數、病人ヲ扱フ、非常困難シタ。當時八百名許リテ、其、大部分ハ赤痢マリヤ、脚氣アゲトミ、テ、病、蜀黍紅斑病少數、吉模憲者デ、其ニ加ルニ多數、物、帶體物患者ガキタ。藥カ、繩帶トカハ、金、毎三入ナカウタ。

10.5

十四、一九四四年、九月十七日頃、余ハ更ニ多數、重病患者、到着ヲ豫期スル様、ト命セテ、余ハ朝鮮人監視兵カラ、爪哇トバダンジ、向テ、後徳別傷隊が魚雷攻撃ヲ受ケ、多數、死傷者ヲ出シタリ、ナシタ。一九四四年、九月十九日頃、一台、傷病兵運搬自動車、二十名バカリ、患者が到着シタが、大部分ハ一日、一日テ死ンガ。残、者ハバダンジ、監獄バダンジ、病院入レタリ、ナシタ。然シ残リ者達ハ、第四、第五收容所、送ラレ、凡リ一週間後、百五十名、病人ヤ死ニ瀕シタ者ガ、其夜中、余收容所、到着シタ。

甚、頃、我々ハ猶ノ二三年前、衣服、支給ヲ蒙ケタヨリガナガツタ
ニモ拘ハズ。余ハ前述、別働隊、爲ニ出来ルダケ。被服
ヲ出スル。日本軍ニ命セラレタ。日本軍、説明依レバ。
英軍ガ此護送船ヲ韓国流シタリテアリ。又日本軍ハ被
服ヲ支給スルコトガ出来ナリカラ。我々ハ自分テ支給セネバ
ナラスト云ツ。我々ハ出来ルダケ、ヨリシタガ。第四収容
所、ヨリ情ハ非常ニ悪ケタ。

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甚頃我々ハ1913年9月放服、支給ヲ受ケタるゝサナカツト
ニモ拘ハズ。余ハ前述、別働隊、爲ニ出来ルダケ、被服
ヲ出スルニ日本軍ニ命セラシタ。日本軍、説明ニ依レバ、
英軍が此護送船ヲ襲撃シタリ。又日本軍ハ被
服ヲ支給スルコトガ出来ナカツ。我々ハ自分テ支給セネバ
ナラスト云シタ。我々ハ出来ルダケ、3月ヲシテ、第四収容
所、名古屋ハ非常ニ悪カツ。

No. 6

5604.

十五、九四年十一月末余北上ラレアタ道路構築作業未從事入港
八月程前メシラ立ラ者以テ第三收容所から未タ事ヲ通告
サレ。彼等北上ラテハ英諸ラ話ハ極悪形日本人學校公ラ
中尉、指揮ヲ仰ハ居ラ。
之等者者非常工敷用能ヤア未タガソレモ拘ハス日本鐵道
建設作業ヲセシム。ムラ中尉、余ヲ訪問シ彼、收容所、英國兵士
指揮入心為先住英國學校ト本ナシ。和蘭兵士非常ニ有能ナ和蘭
學校、乃は英國統治下入マトシ。指揮ニヰルアシテル。テラ
大尉、指揮下アリ。余ハ中收容所、英國兵士指揮スル為ニ
ハトシ大尉ヲ參テ彼、其、自ムラ中尉ニ伴ヒテ去ラ行カ。

十六、比、頃、傳聞、國不_ハ能、於況、事速ニ至心化ニ居テ、余再ヒ土佐中尉、狀
況、以甚ヲ繰、源、口謀、原シ。嘆願、全、拒否セシ。被、一月約十名
ト云、死亡率、上昇、全、食糧不足、過激、傷、傷、依セモ、アラコト
ヲ示、統計報、書、提出シカ、土佐中尉、唯、余、學校モト仕事
サセ、キナトス、余、莫、軍、傳、單、日本、戰、宣、通、妨、害、居
作、考、半、死、不、少、之、等、情、勘、兩、至、心、化、又、與、地、收、容、所、而、氣、
置、者、上、常、收、容、所、半、健、康、ニ、未、ト、者、ト、總、工、事、業、接、心
為、三、死、亡、率、高、ト、云。

No.7

十七、五、年、六、月、十六、日、頃、余、一、九、四、五、年、八、月、十五、日、迄、鐵道、之、歲、廿、六、
ナラス、其、為、皆、事、未、者、增、仕、事、出、ケ、六、ナラ、ナ、ト、上、通、告、セ
タ。概、忙、議、モ、拘、ラ、ス、日本、人、依、医、療、上、向、互、ガ、ア、リ、兵、隊、無
理、仕、事、出、セ、シ、ノ。

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全地域、健康状態、今や急速悪化し、アリ。禁酒、全然手に入らず、全隊、全員、疲弊累々、監視兵、鉄道官吏、絶えず酷使、為三全、人々非常に意氣沮喪しテ居テ、憲兵隊監視、加童が感ぜらし更三種々、規律、庄重さ我今加へラシム。

五、左、余がストラテ指揮シテ居十八日間、我々、状態閑、責任ヲ有スル幸ル犯罪者、名前久々人相添へ。

宮崎大尉 ハカンハル、地区、全俘虜收容所、責任者、中背、肥工將校テ、目立テ余視テアリ、彼ハ何等收容所、福祉、八閑心ヲ見セナリ、シテ其處、状態ヲヨク承知シテ居ガラ、我今ハ少し、援助モ頼マタ、實際、彼ハ交渉ヲ持手掛ケルヒト、何時モ頼柄アリ。

居中尉 第二收容所、收容所指揮官、宮崎大尉、副官、彼モ亦中背、肥工將校、幸ハ余が終テ余、俾キ知シテ、六戰友時計屋アリト、事務隊村山、庄宣、全責任者アリ、彼收容所、屢々訪問シ病兵、一群が指示サルト、彼、唯笑テ、我々俘虜遇ナト言、非道人間、監視兵、対テモ你等、統制力モ持テ居カシム。

石井中尉(軍医) ハカンハル、地区、全收容所、軍医、背、性、眼鏡ヲカケタ日本人將校、軍学生、危急事情ヲヨク知テ居ガラ、其、状態ヲ改善スルハ未ト云テ居タ、シテ医療帶等ハ手本集ナリト、彼が言シモカ、ハラス日本軍、消費用トシハ、洪山持テ居リ、降服後、我々が斯モ熱心ニ日本シテ、極端ヲ非常ニヨリ量ニム。

10. 8

加藤軍曹 第二收容所、一九四四年一月及二月、收容所附軍曹、彼公病人ヲ仕事追立テル、好キテ非常酷使者アリ、彼ハ收容所三月止可能ナ制限ヲ加ヘ、嚴密細々命令、対テ、違犯者嚴シ罰、五週間以上モ收容所内ヲ支給スルヲ差止メ、モ彼責任下ル、彼ハ童々工作體、因金風、日本人、非常之力アリ、會最終計、筋部隊引領

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北川里吾 一九四五年一月三日同年七月三日第三收容所，收容
許付軍曹。ソナ事がアリ得化スルハ彼前仕着ヨモモト
要り。ソア辛難。旅人及シ特候ヲ特ニ嫌要シ。彼旅人
仕事出ス事ガサキ。彼好キ所割ハ非常ニ重キ材木長
時間頭上ニ持キル事アリ。彼規則ヲ破ル事候ハ嚴
罰スルヤリ。監視兵ヲタ付ケル。

「フジ」二等兵（最終所屬部隊）三三隊、非常看係、ソ
グリテ、幅廣、頭アリ日本兵。仕事上手、私経験中
ノ最も要仕事類兵。彼非常手行爲ヲ心地ヲ特ニセミ、收
容所入リ未だ度母ニ誰カア記録ヲ持テ居リ。
和萬共モニシテ、場合、如リ左足ニ非常大キトモ物が出来
丁度シテ居タリ。シガヤリ12時カタ時、「フジ」が近付キ
未だ。日本兵が未だ何故立ちタリ其理由ヲ尋セシム。
モニシテ足、腫物見セタガ勿シ「フジ」其處ヲ蹴ラセシム。
此、體不整、結果、三日程後足切断シ、三週間程後モニ
「訓練」教官引導演習、鳥死シテシム。此、體不整、自解者、
和萬兄弟部キタリ中尉（軍醫）アリ。諱名ハカニ、
虎。植木本用當時、トキナガシ。

一九四五年十一月十九日

美國空軍空軍中佐

「レ」エス、アーヴィス
署名

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No. 9

北軍事部 一九四四年三月三日午後七時三十分、第三收容所、收容
許附軍事部。ノドナ事かアリ得化ス。彼前仕者ヨリモモト
悪カシ。所ア半難ク。敵人及捕獲ヲ特ニ嫌惡シ。彼ノ
仕事、出立事が多カ。彼、好キナ所割八非常ニ金竹林長
時間、頭上ニ持多九事アリ。彼ノ規則ヲ破ルト仕事八版
割入セラリ。監視兵ヲ多付ケル。」
「フジ二等兵（最終所屬部隊）三隊、非常監視係、シ
クリテ、幅廣、貧人、日本兵、仕事上手、私、経験中
ノ最も悪性監視兵。彼ノ非道行爲ヲ心事ヲ特ニセミ。收
容外、入テ未一度毎三誰カ、記録ヲ持テ居タ。
和藹共「モニ」、場合、如リ、左足ニ非常大重物ガ穿
丁苦シテ居タ。シガヤト治リカタ時、フジが近付ケテ
未だ。日本兵が未心ニ何故立タリ其理由ヲ尋セリ。
「モニハ足、體物ヲ見セタガ勿シ」フジニ其歎テ就ラシム。
此、體物解、結果、三日程後足切断サ、三週間後復モニ
ハ引頸高弓漸衡、死ニシム。此、體物解、目撃者八
和藹軍醫部「キンク」中尉（軍醫）アヒ。諱名「カニ」
虎。植木本軍醫會時、トナリキ。

一九四五年十一月十九日

英國空軍 官軍中佐

「ヒー・エス・アンド・ワイス
署名

Doc. 5604.

No. 9

北川翠喜 一九四四年三月三日午年七月三日第二收容所、收容
附軍營。ソナナ事かアリ得化ス。彼前仕着ヨリモモロ
悪カツ。近アキ難ク。癡人及精神疾ヲ特ニ嫌惡シ。彼癡人
仕事出立事ガナシ。彼、女子ナリ四割八非常ニ童子林木長
時間頭上ニ持多毛丸事アリ。彼規則ヲ破ルト仕事八時
割入セラリ。監視兵ヲタチ付ケル。...
「フジ」三等兵（最終所屬部隊）三隊非常眷族ハ少
ケリ。幅廣、負傷ラリ日本兵。仕事上ナシ、私経験中
「最毛惡」監視兵。彼非常道ト行島ラス心事ヲ特ニ好ミ。收
容外入テ未一度毎誰カテ監視下記録ヲ持テ居ル。
和蘭共「モニ」場合、如「左足」非常大半重物ガ穿
丁苦シテ居ル。レガヤト治リカ行夕時、「フジ」が近付キ
未矣。日本兵が未ハ何故立タリ其理由ヲ尋セリ。
「モニ」ハ足、體格ア見セタガ勿シ「フジ」其外ヲ蹴ラシム。
此、體格、結果、三日程後足切断セシ三日同程後「モニ」
ハ「引負」高弓引腰衝、鳥死シタリ。此、體格、目撃者ハ
和蘭軍營部「キンラ」中尉（軍醫）アリ。譯名「カニ」
虎。植木本軍醫附。ナホセキ。

一九四五年十一月十九日

英國空軍 文官中佐

「セ！」エス・エイヴィス
署名